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CORPORATE LAW FEDERALISM IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT: COMPARING CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES
Camden Hutchison*
A

lthough American and Canadian corporate law
share many similarities, they are also marked by important
institutional differences. Among the most notable are the
differing roles of federal versus state/provincial policymaking in the two countries: while American corporate law has
been deeply influenced by jurisdictional competition among
the states, Canadian law has instead been shaped by federal legislative activity, as seen today in the standardizing influence of the Canada Business Corporations Act. These different institutional histories have led to distinct evolutionary paths, with important substantive consequences for
contemporary corporate law.
Despite considerable academic attention to the subject of corporate law federalism, these historical differences
between Canada and the United States are not well understood. This article explains why jurisdictional competition
arose in the United States but not Canada by examining
the “Great Merger Movement” of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Specifically, this article makes
three related arguments: (1) in the United States, the rise
of jurisdictional competition was driven not by corporate
governance issues, as is often assumed, but rather by the
desire to avoid state and federal antitrust restrictions; (2)
for a variety of reasons, cartelization and price fixing were
more viable in Canada than the United States, delaying the
onset of consolidative mergers; and (3) when the Canadian
merger movement finally arrived, Canadian federal company law readily facilitated industrial consolidation, reducing the incentives for individual provinces to compete to attract company charters.
The different experiences of Canada and the United
States reveal an intriguing historical irony—while Canadian corporate law is sometimes criticized as lacking in competitive responsiveness, the roots of this complacency are
closely tied to the turn-of-the-century merger movement, in
which Canadian law was less restrictive than its traditional
American counterpart.

*

M

algré les nombreuses similitudes que partagent le
droit des affaires américain et canadien, ils sont aussi marqués par des différences institutionnelles importantes. On
compte parmi les plus notables les rôles du fédéral par rapport à ceux des états ou des provinces dans l’élaboration des
politiques des deux pays; tandis que le droit des affaires
américain fut grandement influencé par une compétition
juridictionnelle entre les états, le droit canadien a plutôt été
façonné par l’activité législative fédérale, tel qu’on le voit
aujourd’hui avec l’influence de standardisation de la Loi
canadienne sur les sociétés par actions.
En dépit de l’attention considérable des académiciens
sur le sujet du fédéralisme en droit des affaires, ces différences historiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis ne sont
pas très bien comprises. Cet article entend expliquer pourquoi une compétition juridictionnelle est survenue aux
États-Unis et non au Canada, en analysant le « Grand
mouvement des fusions » de la fin du dix-neuvième et du
début du vingtième siècle. Plus particulièrement, cet article
propose trois arguments : (1) aux États-Unis, la montée de
la compétition juridictionnelle était motivée non pas par les
problèmes de gouvernance des entreprises, tel qu’on le suppose souvent, mais plutôt par le désir d’éviter les restrictions anti-trust étatiques et fédérales; (2) pour plusieurs
raisons, la cartellisation et la fixation des prix étaient plus
viables au Canada qu’aux États-Unis, entraînant un retard
à l’émergence des fusions par consolidation; et (3) lorsque le
mouvement canadien des fusions survint finalement, les
lois sur les compagnies fédérales canadiennes ont grandement facilité la consolidation industrielle, réduisant de ce
fait les incitatifs pour les provinces à compétitionner seules
pour attirer les compagnies à charte.
Les expériences différentes du Canada et des ÉtatsUnis révèlent une intéressante ironie historique — alors
que le droit des affaires canadien est parfois critiqué pour
son manque de réactivité à la concurrence, les racines de
cette complaisance sont étroitement reliées au tournant du
siècle du mouvement des fusions, lors duquel le droit canadien était moins restrictif que sa contrepartie américaine
conventionnelle.
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Introduction
A defining feature of American corporate law is its decentralized institutional structure. Alone among developed nations, the United States has
never adopted a national corporation law, leaving the formation and governance of business organizations to the laws of the individual states.
This subnational system may seem quaint in an era of globalized economic activity, but it has given rise to one of the world’s most influential business jurisdictions—the state of Delaware.1 Indeed, Delaware’s success is
widely attributed to the nature of the US system itself, which has incentivized states to tailor their laws in order to attract out-of-state firms.2
Many scholars argue that state competition has undermined corporate
governance standards,3 while others praise it as an important source of

1

Today, Delaware is the legal home to over one million business entities (many of which
are based outside the United States), including over two-thirds of the Fortune 500. See
Jeffrey W Bullock, “Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual Report” (2015)
at 1, online: State of Delaware <corpfiles.delaware.gov> [perma.cc/ZP3J-VAMU].

2

Under the US constitutional system, corporations organized under the laws of a particular state are free to do business in any other state, regardless of geographic location.
For practical purposes, this ability means corporations may freely select their preferred
body of corporate law. See Jesse H Choper, John C Coffee, Jr, & Ronald J Gilson, Cases
and Materials on Corporations, 8th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business,
2013) at 229–34. Moreover, because states obtain economic benefits by attracting out-ofstate firms—including incorporation fees, franchise taxes, and business for corporate
service providers—states have strong incentives to adapt their laws to the preferences
of corporations themselves. As discussed in this article, Delaware has long been the
most successful participant in this competition. For the classic analyses of state law
competition, see generally William L Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware” (1974) 83:4 Yale LJ 663; Ralph K Winter, Jr, “State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation” (1977) 6:2 J Leg Stud 251 [Winter,
“State Law, Shareholder Protection”]; Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1993) [Romano, The
Genius of American Corporate Law].

3

For a variety of critical perspectives on state law competition, see e.g. Oren Bar-Gill,
Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, “The Market for Corporate Law” (2006) 162:1 J Institutional & Theor Econ 134 at 137–41, 145–46; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law”
(1992) 105:7 Harv L Rev 1435 at 1440–45; Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, “Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?” (2002) 90:6 Cal L
Rev 1775 at 1806–20; Lucian A Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, “Federal Corporate Law:
Lessons From History” (2006) 106:7 Colum L Rev 1793 at 1823–38; Cary, supra note 2;
Ralph Nader, Mark Green & Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York:
WW Norton & Company, 1976) at 54–61; Donald E Schwartz, “Federalism and Corporate Governance” (1984) 45:3 Ohio St LJ 545 at 546–51; Joel Seligman, “A Brief History
of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899” (1976) 1:2 Del J Corp L 249 at 283–87;
Gordon G Young, “Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts” (1977)
41:3 Law & Contemp Probs 146 at 150–51.
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economically efficient legal rules.4 Regardless of perspective, nearly all
agree that jurisdictional competition has profoundly shaped American
law.5
Superficially, Canadian corporate law appears to share a similar decentralized character. In Canada, the provinces, territories, and federal
government each have the power to form corporations, and—as in the
United States—corporations are not required to be physically located in
their “home” jurisdiction.6 Despite these structural similarities, significant jurisdictional competition has never emerged in Canada. Indeed, Canadian corporate law has instead been characterized by increasing uniformity, particularly in recent decades.7 Rather than develop their own
distinct legal rules, many provinces have followed the Canada Business

4

See e.g. Barry D Baysinger & Henry N Butler, “The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm” (1985) 28:1 JL & Econ 179 at 184–91; Robert Daines, “Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value?” (2001) 62:3 J Fin Econ 525; Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel
R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 212–27; Daniel R Fischel, “The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law” (1982) 76:6 Nw
UL Rev 913; Roberta Romano, “Corporate Law as the Paradigm for Contractual Choice
of Law” in FH Huckley, ed, The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1999) 370 at 373–74; Roberta Romano, “Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1:2 JL Econ & Org 225 [Romano, “Law as a Product”]; Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 32–47; Ralph K
Winter, Government and the Corporation (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978) at 28–42; Winter, “State Law, Shareholder Protection”, supra note 2.

5

Although jurisdictional competition has been historically significant, it is doubtful
whether any states seriously compete with Delaware today. See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law” (2002) 55:3
Stan L Rev 679.

6

See Poonam Puri et al, Cases, Materials and Notes on Partnerships and Canadian
Business Corporations, 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 68–69, 167–71.

7

See Stanley M Beck et al, Cases and Materials on Partnerships and Canadian Business
Corporations (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 152; Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “The Rationales Underlying Reincorporation and Implications for Canadian Corporations” (2002) 22:3 Intl Rev L & Econ 277 at 280 [Cumming & MacIntosh, “Rationales Underlying Reincorporation”]; Douglas J Cumming & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “The
Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law” (2000)
20:2 Intl Rev L & Econ 141 at 159–60, 189 [Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional
Competition”]; Jeff MacIntosh, “The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping
Canadian Corporate Law: A Second Look” (1993) University of Toronto Law and Economics Working Paper No 18 at 22–23 [MacIntosh, “Working Paper”]; Puri et al, supra
note 6 at 170–71; Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2
at 118–28. Note, however, that competition can also result in uniformity (prices will be
uniform in a perfectly competitive market, for example).
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Corporations Act, a federal act passed in 1975 to modernize Canadian
corporate law.8
In the United States, the costs and benefits of state competition have
long been subject to academic debate. The question of whether state competition leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency—often referred to as
the “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate—is one of the classic research issues in American corporate legal scholarship.9 Despite the
attention it has received in the United States, the possibility of similar
competition in Canada remains underexplored. For a time, the only published research on the subject was by Ronald Daniels, then at the University of Toronto. Writing in the early 1990s, Daniels questioned the benefits of standardization, a goal he saw as unduly emphasized by the Canadian corporate legal community.10 In his article “Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market,” Daniels argued
in favour of jurisdictional competition in the model of the United States.
Despite his enthusiasm, however, Daniels acknowledged institutional obstacles to greater provincial competition in Canada. According to Daniels,
these obstacles included (1) the broad and overlapping jurisdiction of the
provincial securities regulators and (2) the centralized appellate authority
of the Supreme Court of Canada, both of which served to limit the development of distinctive provincial corporate law.11
In response to Daniels, Jeffrey MacIntosh and Douglas Cumming have
expressed skepticism as to the viability of Canadian jurisdictional competition.12 Unlike Daniels, who sees provincial conformity around the CBCA
as the product of competitive pressures, MacIntosh and Cumming find little evidence that provinces compete for corporations. Employing a variety
of statistical measures, the authors conclude that provincial legislatures
have pursued a strategy of uniformity, not competition, and that a number of institutional barriers have discouraged provincial legal innova8

RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. The current corporation acts of Alberta, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan are based on the CBCA. British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Quebec each
have their own distinctive acts, though these have also been influenced by the CBCA.

9

See supra note 3 and note 4 and accompanying text.

10

See generally Ronald J Daniels, “Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market” (1991) 36:1 McGill LJ 130.

11

See ibid at 182–84, 186–88. Daniels also addressed (and dismissed) a number of other
possible obstacles, including the inability of the provinces to realize minimum efficient
scale, professional conservatism on the part of Canadian legal practitioners, and the geographic concentration of businesses in central/eastern Canada (ibid at 180–188).

12

See MacIntosh, “Working Paper”, supra note 7; Cumming & MacIntosh, “Rationales
Underlying Reincorporation”, supra note 7 at 288–97; Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7.
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tion.13 Like Daniels, MacIntosh and Cumming cite provincial securities
regulation and the centralized appellate authority of the Supreme Court
of Canada as factors undermining provincial competition.14 But they also
point to broader obstacles, including the relatively sparse body of Canadian corporate legal precedent (which encourages provincial courts to rely
on cases from other provinces),15 protectionist regulations of provincial
law societies (which have discouraged Canadian lawyers from recommending out-of-province incorporation),16 and a general lack of “competitive consciousness” among the Canadian legal and policy communities.17
Writing from the American perspective, Roberta Romano has cited many
of these same factors as discouraging jurisdictional competition in Canada.18 Finally, Christopher Nicholls offers a simpler explanation—given the
smaller size of the Canadian economy, there may not be enough revenue
at stake to incentivize provinces to actively compete.19 Ultimately, although perspectives on the issue vary, the existing literature broadly suggests that competition among the provinces has been limited by institutional factors distinctive to Canadian federalism.
Without disputing these factors, this article takes a different approach
to the question of Canadian legal competition. Rather than analyzing the
current institutional environment, this article provides a historical explanation of how that environment came to exist. More specifically, this article argues that divergent patterns of jurisdictional competition in Canada
and the United States can be traced to the corporate merger movements
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.20 During this period,
13

See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7.

14

See ibid at 154–56.

15

See ibid at 155.

16

See ibid at 169–71.

17

Ibid at 151.

18

See Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 118–28.

19

See Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) at 35.
But see Daniels, supra note 10 (who anticipates this argument in his original article
at 180).

20

In the American historiography, this movement is referred to as the “Great Merger
Movement.” See e.g. Naomi R Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American
Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Although
historians invariably describe this movement in terms of “mergers”, relatively few
transactions of the period were mergers (or amalgamations) in the legal sense. Under
most corporation acts, mergers were restricted to domestic corporations incorporated in
the same jurisdiction, limiting the usefulness of statutory mergers as a means of creating national firms. As discussed in this article, most national firms during the Great
Merger Movement were created by stock or asset purchases. To minimize confusion and
to remain consistent with the existing literature, this article adopts the historical convention of using the term “merger” to refer to any consolidation of two or more busi-
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both Canada and the United States experienced unprecedented industrial
consolidation, as thousands of formerly independent firms disappeared into “trusts” or “combines”.21 Although the merger movements in the two
countries shared many similarities, they occurred within very different
legal contexts. In the United States, prohibitions on consolidation at both
the state and federal levels channeled businesses toward jurisdictions offering an “escape” from corporate merger restrictions. By the time of the
Canadian merger movement, neither the federal government nor the individual provinces imposed meaningful limits on consolidation, and companies were generally free to merge and expand as they saw fit. Significantly, Canadian federal company legislation was relatively liberal,22 such
that a majority of the largest Canadian businesses chose to incorporate
under federal law.23 Thus, while legal conditions in the United States led
to a “race” to dismantle corporate restrictions, there was less opportunity
for Canadian provinces to offer similar advantages. In effect, the permissiveness of federal law precluded provincial competition.
Given current perceptions of Canadian corporate law, this history presents an intriguing irony: today, Canadian law is sometimes criticized as
insufficiently attentive to business needs, and a number of scholars have
suggested the benefits of a more competitive, US-style system.24 Though
nesses, no matter how consummated. Similarly, this article refers to the combined firms
resulting from mergers as “combinations”.
21

Ibid. See generally Gregory P Marchildon, Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the
Gilded Age of Canadian Finance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 245–59
[Marchildon, Profits and Politics]. The popular term for these combinations in the United States was “trusts,” whereas in Canada they were referred to as “combines.” Neither
were technical terms, but were used generically to refer to large corporations (ibid). As
discussed in this article, the timing of the merger movements in the two countries was
somewhat different, with the first Canadian merger wave lagging the United States’ by
about a decade (ibid at 258). Similar merger movements also occurred in the United
Kingdom and Germany, though on a smaller scale than in North America (ibid at 247–
48).

22

For purposes of this article, the word “liberal” means legally permissive. Thus, Canadian law was “liberal” in that it placed few constraints on business activities.

23

See Part II B below. The Parliament of Canada adopted successive companies acts
(providing for federal incorporation of joint stock companies) in 1869, 1877, 1902, and
1934. The current CBCA is a descendant of these earlier acts.

24

See Cumming & MacIntosh, “Interjurisdictional Competition”, supra note 7 at 142;
Daniels, supra note 10; Ronald J Daniels & Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “Toward a Distinctive
Canadian Corporate Law Regime” (1991) 29:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 863 at 898–99; Stéphane Rousseau, “The Evolution of Corporate Law in Canada: Towards Regulatory
Competition?” (2016) at 3, 10–13, online (pdf): SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2752131>. Many scholars have questioned recent corporate law decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Given the Court’s authority over the Canadian
judicial system, these criticisms raise questions regarding Canada’s centralized corporate law jurisprudence. See e.g. Sarah P Bradley, “BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders:
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not directly related, these criticisms run parallel to more general conceptions of Canadian law, particularly its greater solicitude for corporate social responsibility. These conceptions—that Canadian jurisprudence has
rejected the shareholder primacy norm, that directors’ duties are fundamentally tied to notions of the “good corporate citizen,” and that Canadian
courts are increasingly responsive to environmental, social, and community interests25—distinguish Canadian law, in the eyes of many scholars,
from the more narrow focus on economic profits that has traditionally
characterized American law.26 Recent amendments to the CBCA have only strengthened this impression.27 But while Canadian corporate law may
be moving toward a broader conception of social responsibility, its focus
during the early twentieth century could hardly have been more different.

The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance and Good Corporate Citizenship?” (2009–2010) 41:2 Ottawa L Rev 325; Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties”
(2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 232; Mohamed F Khimji, “Peoples v. Wise – Conflating Directors’ Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholder Protection” (2005) 39:1 UBC L Rev 209; Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “BCE and the Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quicksand” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 255; J Anthony VanDuzer, “BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples” (2010) 43:1 UBC L Rev 205; Jacob S Ziegel, “The Peoples Judgment
and the Supreme Court’s Role in Private Law Cases” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 236.
25

For a discussion of the status of non-shareholder “stakeholder” constituencies under
Canadian law, see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law” (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 299 at 300–02; Jeffrey Bone, “Corporate Environmental Responsibility in the Wake of the Supreme Court Decision of BCE Inc. and Bell
Canada” (2009) 27 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 5 at 7; Carol Liao, “The Next Stage of
CSR for Canada: Transformational Corporate Governance, Hybrid Legal Structures,
and the Growth of Social Enterprise” (2013) 9:1 JSDLP 53 at 69–73; Carol Liao, “A Critical Canadian Perspective on the Benefit Corporation” (2017) 40:2 Seattle UL Rev 683
at 700–03; PM Vasudev, “Corporate Stakeholders in Canada—An Overview and a Proposal” (2013–2014) 45:1 Ottawa L Rev 137 at 165–71. As these authors emphasize, the
power of corporate directors to consider broader stakeholder interests has significantly
expanded in the wake of Peoples Department Stores v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples Department Stores] and BCE v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 [BCE].

26

Even under Delaware law, the status of shareholder primacy as an enforceable legal
norm is unclear. Shareholder primacy has nearly overwhelming influence as a practical
and normative matter, however. For discussion of the legal force of the shareholder
primacy norm, see generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 439; Robert J Rhee, “A Legal Theory of
Shareholder Primacy” (2018) 102:5 Minn L Rev 1951; Leo E Strine, Jr, “Our Continuing
Struggle with The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit” (2012) 47:1 Wake
Forest L Rev 135. See also Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc v Newmark, 16 A 3d 1 at 34–35
(Del Ch 2010). For a forceful academic challenge to this norm, see Margaret M Blair &
Lynn A Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85:2 Va L Rev 247.

27

Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No 1, SC 2019, c 29, ss 141–44. See also An Act to
Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, and the Competition Act, SC 2018, c 25.
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At the time of the Canadian merger movement, Canadian law was primarily focused on the interests of the business class, eschewing the restrictive antitrust28 provisions that were common in the United States.
Ironically, it was the restrictive nature of American law—and the resulting economic and political pressures—that eventually led to the United
States’ distinctive pattern of jurisdictional competition. As similar restrictions on corporations were largely absent from Canadian law, pressures to eliminate them never organically emerged.
Following this introduction, the remainder of this article proceeds as
follows. Part II describes how merger restrictions led to competition
among the states. In the context of the industrial consolidation of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—during which many states’
corporate laws prevented or discouraged mergers—the state of New Jersey attracted corporations by facilitating national combinations. New Jersey’s success in drawing corporations (and the associated tax revenues)
led to a decades-long period of state competition, in which Delaware was
the eventual winner. Part III examines the Canadian experience, in which
jurisdictional competition was relatively muted. In Canada, the absence of
meaningful antitrust restrictions and the permissiveness of federal company law reduced both demand-side pressure (from the business community) and supply-side pressure (from provincial governments) for major
corporate law reform. Part IV concludes, assessing (1) how historical differences between Canada and the United States have influenced the substance of corporate law and (2) whether circumstances exist for increasing
competition in Canada today.

I. State Corporate Chartermongering29 and the Rise of Delaware
American corporate law is often identified with the law of Delaware,
the country’s leading jurisdiction for business organizations. Through its
dominance of the incorporation market for the largest American firms,
Delaware exerts an outsized influence on the American corporate legal
landscape.30 In the academic literature, Delaware’s prominence is often
attributed to its accommodating corporate governance standards, which

28

In this article, the term “antitrust” refers not only to federal competition legislation, but
also state corporate law restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. Both federal antitrust
legislation and state corporate law restrictions were products of the same populist
movement of the late nineteenth century.

29

For a definition of “chartermongering”, see Christopher Grandy, “New Jersey Corporate
Chartermongering, 1875–1929” (1989) 49:3 J Econ Hist 677 (“the active solicitation of
corporation Charters for the purpose of bolstering state revenues” at 677).

30

See Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law, supra note 2 at 6–12.
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appeal to the managers who control incorporation decisions.31 Although
corporate governance is an important factor in Delaware’s success, the origins of the state’s rise to prominence are actually grounded in antitrust
policy. As this Part explains, it was legal restrictions on industrial consolidation at both the state and federal levels that incited the race toward
permissive corporation laws. Given the focus of corporate legal scholarship on the relationship between management and shareholders, and its
conception of jurisdictional competition almost exclusively in terms thereof, recovering the role of antitrust policy in state competition is an important corrective. Moreover, this history provides a revealing contrast to
the Canadian consolidation experience, in which meaningful restrictions
on mergers and combinations were largely absent.

A. Mounting Industrial Consolidation
During the late nineteenth century, technological, economic, and demographic developments led to a major increase in American industrial
consolidation.32 By the late 1880s, improvements in transportation, communication, and manufacturing technologies significantly increased returns to scale across a range of emerging industries.33 Combined with rapid population growth, this “second industrial revolution” led to profound
economic change—creating new markets, increasing productivity, and
giving rise to ever larger firms.34 In the 1890s, these changes culminated
in a sudden, sweeping wave of industrial mergers. During the ten-year
period of 1895–1904, more than 1,800 independent firms disappeared into
business combinations.35 Many of the firms resulting from these mergers—commonly referred to as “trusts”—obtained dominant positions
within their respective industries.36
Several factors contributed to this “Great Merger Movement,” the
most extensive period of business consolidation in American history. The
leading explanation is that of economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux,
whose monograph The Great Merger Movement in American Business,
31

See e.g. Cary, supra note 2 at 669; Winter, supra note 2 at 25255. Whereas Cary criticizes Delaware’s “race for the bottom” (at 705), Winter argues that states cannot “rig”
their corporate law because the ensuing capital flight and threat of takeovers would deter managers from choosing inefficient jurisdictions (at 254, 289).

32

See generally Alfred D Chandler, Jr, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 47–233 [Chandler, Scale
and Scope].

33

See ibid.

34

See ibid.

35

See Lamoreaux, supra note 20 at 2.

36

See ibid at 1–5; Chandler, supra note 32 at 315–44.
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1895–1904 provides a theoretical and empirical account of why and how
the movement occurred.37 According to Lamoreaux, while the movement
reflected fundamental changes in the structure of the American economy,
it was triggered by a “particular conjunction” of specific historical circumstances: (1) the rapid expansion of capital-intensive (and thus high-fixedcost) industries in the early 1890s, (2) the financial panic of 1893, which
caused a sudden reduction in aggregate demand and a subsequent increase in price competition, and (3) efforts to combat falling prices
through anti-competitive business combinations.38 This conjunction of
high fixed costs and depressed economic conditions in the 1890s created
an environment of “ruinous” price competition (i.e., pricing below average
cost) that businessmen were desperate to alleviate.39 However, given the
size, diversity, and competitiveness of the American economy, cartel and
other price-fixing arrangements proved difficult to enforce.40 To make
matters worse, price fixing was declared illegal by the Sherman Act of
1890.41 Given these practical and legal constraints on agreements among
independent firms, mergers became the favoured means of reducing competition.42
Although Lamoreaux’s account is foundational, other scholars have offered additional explanations for the Great Merger Movement. Business
historians such as Alfred Chandler have explained the merger movement
primarily in terms of the efficiency of large-scale management processes.43
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According to Chandler, the development of modern business management
was critical to the success of integrated firms, as it facilitated the harnessing of new technologies and the resultant economies in production and
distribution.44 Another explanation for the Great Merger Movement is the
development of a national equity market, which first emerged for “industrial” corporations (i.e., manufacturers) in the 1890s.45 As financial markets recovered from the panic of 1893, increasing demand for industrial
securities encouraged “promoters”46 to organize large business combinations financed by public shares.47 Due to the monopoly profits available
from merging competing firms (as per Lamoreaux), the greater economic
efficiency of large, integrated businesses (as per Chandler), or simply the
market speculation of the late 1890s and early 1900s, stock offerings by
industrial combinations sold readily and at high premiums.48 Finally, federal tariff policy—which impeded foreign price competition—also encouraged the merger movement by protecting domestic monopolies.49 Ulti44

See Chandler, The Visible Hand, supra note 43.

45
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mately, each of these various factors played a role, providing firms with a
number of reasons to merge with their competitors.
Consolidation was hindered, however, by state and federal antitrust
law. At the federal level, the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited a range of
anticompetitive activity. Section 1 of the act barred “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States.”50 Section 2 spoke to monopoly directly, declaring “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, ... any part of the trade or commerce” to be guilty of
a misdemeanor.51 Despite this broad language, however, the act’s practical significance was limited. Private and government enforcement was
minimal, meaning few cases were brought to clarify the act’s provisions.52
Due to weak enforcement by the federal government and the inherent
ambiguity of the act’s language, voluntary compliance on the part of businesses was indifferent, at best.53 In the years following the act’s adoption,
many firms continued to engage in anticompetitive business practices.54
Moreover, under the historical conception of the division of power between the federal government and the states, federal prosecutors had
greater scope to attack price fixing among independent firms (which
Lamoreaux refers to as “loose” combinations) than monopolies organized
as single, integrated corporations (which Lamoreaux refers to as “tight”
combinations).55 According to the constitutional understanding of the
time, the regulation of corporations—no matter how large or powerful—
was properly reserved to the state governments responsible for their creation.56 This conception of the states’ role in regulating corporations was
strengthened by the US Supreme Court’s early Sherman Act decisions. In
a series of cases in the 1890s, the US Supreme Court interpreted the
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Sherman Act to prohibit “restraints of trade,”57 but to allow the formation
of monopolies by directly acquiring competitors.58 This legal result—in
which price fixing was illegal but mergers to monopoly were not—
incentivized mergers as a means of reducing competition.59 Ironically, the
practical effect of the Sherman Act was to encourage combinations, which
significantly increased in size and number in the decade following its enactment.60
Federal law was not the only obstacle to consolidation, however. During the late nineteenth century, state corporation acts placed major limits
on the size and structure of corporations.61 These acts, reflecting the historical legacy of Jacksonian democracy and an enduring suspicion of concentrated power, imposed substantial limits on corporate capitalization,
duration of corporate existence, and the scope of corporations’ business activities.62 By the late 1880s, public concern over the emergence of trusts
had become a major political issue, and state lawmakers and Attorneys
General became increasingly aggressive in attacking combinations.63
These attacks came in two forms—legislative and prosecutorial. On the
legislative front, a common approach was to add antitrust provisions di-
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rectly to corporate or criminal statutes, a measure taken by twenty seven
states as of 1890.64 Many of these provisions forbade corporations from
purchasing or holding other corporations’ stock, thereby preventing the
“holding company” structure as a means of effecting corporate mergers.65
With respect to litigation, several states brought successful actions
against large combinations, claiming they had exceeded their powers under the state’s corporate franchise.66 These cases were generally predicated on one of two legal doctrines: (1) the common law principle of ultra vires or (2) statutory grants to state Attorneys General of the power to bring
quo warranto proceedings.67 In light of these corporate law devices—and
notwithstanding the weakness of the Sherman Act—state law served as a
major impediment to large-scale industrial mergers.
Specific examples illustrate these laws’ general character. New York
and Illinois—along with twenty-five other states—expressly prohibited
combinations for the purpose of reducing competition.68 New York’s Stock
Corporation Law barred mergers “for the creation of a monopoly or the
unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of competition in any
necessary of life,”69 while Illinois’ Trusts and Conspiracies Against Trade
act provided that any corporation guilty of fixing prices, restricting output, or otherwise reducing competition “shall thereby forfeit its charter
and franchise, and its corporate existence shall cease.”70 Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts limited corporate size and capital structure, another common approach. In both states, industrial corporations were prohibited
from having more than one million dollars’ capital stock, along with other

64
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restrictions.71 Finally, quo warranto laws were a powerful means of attacking monopolistic trusts, as demonstrated by the dramatic prosecution
of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (discussed below). Armed with statutory proscriptions, quo warranto powers, and the common law doctrine
of ultra vires, states were equipped with a variety of tools for combatting
corporate consolidation.72
Many states used these tools aggressively. Each of the states listed in
Annex A pursued major legal actions against the large combinations that
began to emerge in the late 1880s and early 1890s. To give but a few
prominent examples, the Attorney General of Illinois brought a successful
quo warranto proceeding against the Chicago Gas Trust Company in the
late 1880s, challenging the company’s strategy of buying out its major
competitors.73 Deciding the matter on appeal in 1889, the Illinois Supreme
Court held, as a matter of Illinois law, that corporations were not permitted to acquire the stock of other corporations, particularly if their motive
was to reduce competition.74 A year later, the New York Court of Appeals
approved a similar quo warranto action against a constituent corporation
of the infamous Havemeyer “Sugar Trust.”75 After holding that the corporation had exceeded its legal authority by joining a horizontal combination, the Court invoked the “extreme rigor of the law,” sentencing the defendant to “corporate death.”76 As a final example, the famous attempt by
the Attorney General of Ohio to destroy the Standard Oil Trust provides
evidence of both the strengths and weaknesses of state corporate law as a
means of imposing antitrust restrictions.77 Although the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled in favour of Standard Oil Company on statute of limitations
grounds, it also prohibited the corporation from continuing to participate

71
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in the larger trust.78 This prohibition proved ineffective—following the
ruling, Standard Oil abandoned its trust structure and reorganized as a
New Jersey corporation.79 Standard Oil was not alone in its decision to reincorporate.80 By the 1890s, New Jersey had emerged as a protective haven from the “extreme rigor” of its sister states.

B. New Jersey Chartermongering
As American industry consolidated, New Jersey took advantage of the
obstacles imposed by other states. Even before the 1890s, New Jersey was
a welcoming home to corporations—its 1875 corporation act was relatively
permissive for its time81 and its conservative judiciary was well regarded
by the Wall Street bar.82 Capitalizing on its reputation, New Jersey embarked on a series of reforms that made it more attractive to out-of-state
firms.83 New Jersey’s liberal policy toward corporations—motivated by a
desire to attract corporate tax and franchise revenues—precipitated the
race in corporate law reform, as legislators in other states sought to replicate New Jersey’s strategy.84
The ability of New Jersey to draw businesses from other states was a
result of the peculiar status of corporations under American federalism.
Since the US government had never enacted a federal corporation act,
corporations could only be formed under the laws of individual states.85 In
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addition, the Commerce Clause86 limited states’ power to discriminate
against “foreign” (out-of-state) corporations, preventing state governments
from excluding corporations organized in other states.87 Finally, under the
“internal affairs” doctrine, a corporation’s internal governance was regulated by its state of incorporation, not the laws of other states in which it
did business.88 Together, these principles allowed corporations to avoid
unfavourable legal rules through jurisdictional selection. Having dispensed with any legal requirement that shareholders or directors be state
residents, and having explicitly empowered corporations to do business in
other states, New Jersey emerged as a favoured destination for large industrial combinations.89
Beginning in the late 1880s, New Jersey revised its corporation act
specifically to attract out-of-state capital. In response to lobbying efforts
by James B. Dill, a talented and ambitious Wall Street attorney, New Jersey enacted a number of reforms presumably for the purpose of attracting
New York promoters.90 Among these reforms, the most significant was an
1889 amendment allowing corporations to freely purchase the stock
and/or assets of out-of-state firms.91 Attracted by these reforms, industri-
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alists and promoters fearing legal attack in their home states began to incorporate in New Jersey.92 In 1896, the entirety of the New Jersey corporation act was comprehensively rewritten by a revision commission
chaired by Dill.93 This 1896 act is widely credited by US scholars as the
first modern, “enabling” corporation act.94 Its logical organization and
minimal legal requirements were a far cry from other state corporation
statutes of the time, which were needlessly complex and arbitrarily restrictive by modern standards. Even more important to corporate promoters—and in keeping with New Jersey tradition—the act included no prohibitions on trusts, monopolies, or combinations.95
As the merger movement accelerated in the mid-1890s, New Jersey
reaped the fiscal benefits of its liberal corporation act. By several
measures, the state quickly became the dominant corporate jurisdiction in
the United States: between 1895 and 1904, 50% of combinations by number and nearly 80% of combinations by value were incorporated in New
Jersey.96 Between 1896 and 1901, New Jersey incorporations increased
nearly 200%, eventually providing more than 60% of the state’s total tax
revenue.97 By 1904, all seven of financial analyst John Moody’s “greater
industrial trusts”—the largest corporations in the country—were incorporated in New Jersey, as were 162 of 311 “lesser” (but still significant)
trusts.98 Despite its much smaller industrial base compared to wealthier
states such as New York, New Jersey became infamous as “the cradle of
monopolies.”99
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As the merger movement peaked, other states attempted to emulate
New Jersey’s success. A number of states, including Delaware, Maine,
South Dakota, and West Virginia, attempted to compete with New Jersey
by passing similar corporation acts and/or charging lower corporate franchise taxes.100 Even leading industrial states such as New York and Massachusetts were forced to reform their corporation acts to avoid losing
corporations to New Jersey or “one of the chartering states.”101 By the first
decades of the twentieth century, American corporate law was being
transformed by the pressures of jurisdictional competition.102 Ironically, it
was the traditional rigour of American corporate law and its hostility toward monopolies that created the opportunity for a race toward corporate
laxity.

C. State Law Competition and the Rise of Delaware
Given its first-mover advantage, New Jersey was the original leader of
the American incorporation market. Other states attempted to compete,
but New Jersey’s leadership position remained secure. Incorporators had
little reason to venture into untested waters given the predictability and
reliability of the New Jersey legal system.103 As New Jersey had invested
heavily in its corporate-friendly reputation, businesses could be reasonably assured it would not engage in radical reform.104 These assurances
evaporated in the second decade of the twentieth century, however, when
the New Jersey legislature suddenly passed a series of strict antitrust
provisions.105 Following this unwelcome political development, the nation’s largest corporations migrated to the state of Delaware—where, by
and large, they remain today.
Prior to New Jersey’s political reversal, Delaware was its most active
competitor. In 1899, Delaware enacted a corporation act that was substantially similar to the New Jersey statute.106 The biggest difference be-
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tween the two states was that Delaware charged lower franchise taxes.107
Given these lower taxes, Delaware lawyers and corporate service providers could essentially compete on price, marketing their state as a lowercost alternative to New Jersey.108 This strategy saw some, albeit limited,
success. By the end of the Great Merger Movement, Delaware had attracted thirteen of the country’s major industrial trusts—more than its
small state competitors such as Maine and West Virginia, but far fewer
than New Jersey or even traditional industrial states such as New
York.109 Although Delaware earned a reputation as a corporate-friendly
jurisdiction, New Jersey continued to lead the incorporation market.110
This state of affairs continued until the presidential election of 1912,
an unusual three-way contest among Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic
governor of New Jersey, William Howard Taft, the incumbent Republican
president, and former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt, who ran
on an independent progressive party ticket.111 Wilson campaigned on a
Democratic platform of progressive economic reform, a position at odds
with his home state’s image as the “mother of trusts.”112 When Wilson
called for stronger antitrust laws on the campaign trail, Roosevelt—who
was popularly regarded as a “trust buster” for his administration’s prosecution of antitrust cases—taunted Wilson for his inaction against the
trusts during his tenure as New Jersey governor.113 Although Wilson won
the election, the trust issue remained a source of political embarrassment.
In his final annual message as governor of New Jersey, Wilson called for

107
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legislation to bring corporations under stricter control.114 The Democratcontrolled state legislature obliged, passing seven broad antitrust provisions in early 1913.115 Among other restrictions, these provisions prohibited any “combination or agreement between corporations, firms, or persons” in restraint of trade; the purchase, holding, or disposition by any
corporation of the securities of any competing corporation; and price discrimination between different buyers, markets, or areas within the
state.116 These enactments, known popularly as the “seven sisters,” were
an abrupt and unexpected shift in New Jersey’s policy toward corporations,117 imposing many of the same antitrust restrictions that firms came
to New Jersey to avoid. Virtually overnight, New Jersey transformed from
a corporate haven to a minefield of legal and political risk.
The reaction was foreseeable. Following enactment of the seven sisters, New Jersey incorporations declined as firms opted for other states.
Delaware was the primary beneficiary of this shift, likely because its corporation act was so similar to New Jersey’s.118 During the period 1912–
1920, annual incorporations in Delaware increased more than 400% (from
1,427 to 5,747), while annual corporation revenues increased over 900%
(from $168,244 to $1,570,620).119 Over the same period, New Jersey’s corporation revenues gradually declined, as new corporations shunned the
state and existing corporations choose to leave it.120
Realizing the consequences of its actions, the New Jersey legislature
attempted to reverse course by weakening the seven sisters in 1917.121
The damage had already been done, however. By enacting the seven sisters, New Jersey irreparably damaged its pro-corporate reputation.122 Reversing its decision could not restore the business community’s trust.123
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Delaware, New Jersey’s closest competitor, was able to capture its leadership position.124 In the decades since, the corporate laws of most American
states have become increasingly similar to that of Delaware—itself originally based on the 1896 New Jersey act. In this fashion, the Great Merger
Movement played an important role in the direction of US corporate law.
By placing intense economic and political pressure on legal restrictions
upon corporate power, it gave rise to the jurisdictional competition that
led to those restrictions’ eventual repeal.

II. Industrial Consolidation and Canadian Corporate Law
The demographic, technological, and economic developments that led
to the Great Merger Movement were not unique to the United States.
Similar developments also occurred in other industrialized countries—
including Canada, Great Britain, and Germany—though the timing and
intensity of merger activity varied.125 In Canada, the pattern of industrial
consolidation was similar to that of the United States. Although the merger movement in Canada was much smaller in absolute size, it was comparable in proportion to the size of the national economy.126 The greatest
difference between the two countries is when their merger movements occurred. While the Great Merger Movement in the United States lasted
from 1895 to 1904 (peaking in 1899),127 the first Canadian merger wave
occurred roughly a decade later, from 1909 to 1913 (peaking in 1910).128
The reasons for this lapse were primarily economic—the Canadian
movement arrived later due to the country’s smaller economy, slower pace
of industrialization, and less-developed capital market.129 It was not until
the “Laurier boom” of the first decade of the twentieth century, and the
resulting flow of foreign capital into Canadian equity securities, that
“tight” combinations became financially viable.130 The legal environment
was also a factor. In general, Canadian businesses faced fewer constraints
on price fixing and cartelization, reducing their incentives to merge. As
discussed below, the delayed onset of the Canadian merger movement had
important consequences—by the time of the 1909–1913 merger wave, Ca-
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nadian law had already experienced significant liberalization, precluding
the jurisdictional competition witnessed in the United States.
The American and Canadian merger movements make for a particularly useful historical comparison due to the similarity of their economic
causes and the differences in their legal effects. Although the American
economy was much larger, the two countries’ merger movements were
otherwise similar from an economic perspective. Both countries featured
(1) expansive geographic territories, (2) diversified economies based on agriculture, commodities, and industrial manufacturing, and (3) a shared
Anglo-Saxon commercial tradition. These similarities influenced the industries that were most likely to consolidate, including rail transportation; food processing; agricultural and transportation equipment; and cement, steel, and other heavy manufacturing industries.131 In the United
States, this consolidation was primarily financed by a growing domestic
capital market, while Canadian mergers relied much more heavily on foreign (primarily British) capital.132 In both countries mergers took similar
forms, with promoters arranging combinations of large numbers of smaller competitors.133 Although the specific economic events that precipitated
the movements were different—the American movement being a direct
response to the financial panic of 1893—the broader economic motivations
in both countries were similar: to organize firms large enough to meaningfully reduce market competition.134
Notwithstanding these similarities, the American and Canadian merger movements occurred in different legal and political contexts. In the
United States, a long tradition of political hostility toward concentrated
economic power meant that state law often tightly restricted corporations.135 In Canada, the situation was less antagonistic. Although populist
“anti-combines” sentiment certainly existed, it failed to influence government policy to the same extent as in the United States. For this reason,
the wide variety of antitrust provisions common in US state corporation
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laws never appeared in Canadian federal and provincial incorporation
acts. As discussed in this Part, the permissiveness of Canadian law during the first Canadian merger wave had important institutional consequences: given the absence of major legal obstacles to consolidating mergers, there was little pressure on Canadian jurisdictions to engage in regulatory competition, and thus little likelihood of the organic emergence of
a “Canadian New Jersey.”

A. Canadian Anti-Combines Law
Many of the same political factors that led to antitrust legislation in
the United States were also present in Canada. Throughout the late nineteenth century, Canadian businesses actively sought to limit competition
through the use of cartels, industry agreements, and other forms of pricing collusion.136 These practices were encouraged by Canada’s “National
Policy” of protective tariffs, which facilitated domestic price fixing by limiting foreign competition.137 As many businesses engaged in open restraints of trade, Canadian consumers—facing artificially high prices—
grew increasingly resentful.138 Echoing political developments in the
United States, the strongest opposition to anticompetitive business practices came from western farmers, who blamed the railways, industrial
cartels, and eastern capital generally for their high input and distribution
costs.139 Nevertheless, western agricultural populism was weaker in Canada than the United States, where it grew into a national political movement.140 In Canada, despite widespread resentment toward large corporations, legal reform was staunchly (and successfully) opposed by business
interests, with which the Canadian political elite was broadly sympathetic.141
Although Parliament passed a series of anti-combines acts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their purpose and effect were
136
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largely symbolic.142 In response to public outcry over a particularly noxious grocers’ cartel, combines became a parliamentary issue in the late
1880s. In 1888, Conservative MP Nathaniel Clarke Wallace called for the
creation of a parliamentary committee to investigate the “nature, extent
and effect of certain combinations.”143 Once formed, the committee conducted extensive hearings and issued a voluminous parliamentary report
documenting the existence of anticompetitive cartels in at least eleven
major industries.144 Although the committee determined that the evils of
combines were not yet as advanced as in the United States, it nevertheless recommended parliamentary action to prevent existing combines
from growing any stronger.145 Following the report, Wallace introduced an
anti-combines bill which became law (in amended form) in early 1889.146
The material language of the anti-combines act was contained in section 1:
1. Every person who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with
any other person, or with any railway, steamship, steamboat or
transportation company, unlawfully—
(a) to unduly limit the facilities for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any article or
commodity which may be a subject of trade and commerce; or—
(b) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any such
article or commodity; or—
(c) to unduly prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any such article or commodity, or to unreasonably enhance the price thereof; or—
(d) to unduly prevent or lessen competition in the production,
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, transportation or supply of
any such article or commodity, or in the price of insurance upon
person or property—
Is guilty of a misdemeanor and liable on conviction, to a penalty not
exceeding four thousand dollars and not less than two hundred dollars, or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years; and if
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a corporation, is liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding ten
thousand dollars and not less than one thousand dollars.147

From a legal standpoint, little in the act was actually new. It was essentially a reformulation of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade,
with the addition of criminal penalties.148 Arguably, the act weakened existing common law prohibitions, as it was conditioned throughout by qualifying language such as “unlawfully,” “unduly,” and “unreasonably.”149 It
also provided no resources for investigation or prosecution, begging the
question of enforcement. The act appears to have been passed primarily
for its expressive value, Wallace proclaiming that “the Parliament of Canada have put on record their condemnation of [restraints of trade].”150
Whatever Parliament’s intent, the language of the act rang hollow as a
source of effective criminal prohibitions. In the words of Richard Gosse,
“not only did a criminal offence have to be committed, it had to be committed ‘unduly.’”151
Unsurprisingly, the act had little effect. Its greatest weakness was its
lack of an enforcement mechanism. As a general criminal statute, prosecutions under the act were the responsibility of provincial Attorneys General, who—likely recognizing the act’s infirmity—simply ignored it.152 Only a single indictment was brought in the entire first decade of the act’s
existence, resulting in an acquittal.153 Although Wallace and other likeminded MPs sought to strengthen the act in the 1890s, Wallace’s proposed amendments were defeated by the business lobby. Canadian business interests, which wielded significant influence in Parliament, claimed
“reasonable” restrictions on competition were necessary for their viabil147
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ity.154 Following several failed attempts, the federal anti-combines act was
finally strengthened in 1900,155 but enforcement remained limited.156 Into
the early twentieth century, Canadian business continued to be characterized by “loose” combinations among competing firms.
Circumstances changed, however, with the arrival of the Canadian
merger movement, roughly a decade after the United States. Suddenly,
mergers became the dominant means of limiting competition. Although
comprehensive data on Canadian mergers are unavailable, Gregory
Marchildon has estimated that during the years 1909−1913, at least 195
industrial firms disappeared in at least seventy-one distinct transactions.157 Many of these transactions combined multiple competing firms
into a single industry-wide monopoly, the same pattern observed in the
United States. The logic behind consolidation in the two countries was the
same—by combining competing firms, promoters could offer outside investors the promise of monopoly profits.158
Despite similar motivations, the specific events triggering the movements in Canada and the United States were different. The American
movement began in the wake of a serious economic depression, in a legal
environment in which antitrust policy discouraged agreements to maintain prices. In Canada, the merger movement was an organic response to
the inherent instability of such agreements, made possible by the economic boom of the early twentieth century. As the economy grew, it became
increasingly apparent to Canadian businesses that “loose” combinations
such as cartels and trade associations were difficult to enforce. As economic theory would predict, the higher a cartel attempted to set prices, the
greater the temptation for its members to cheat. Unsanctioned price cut-
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ting by cartel members was rampant, undermining cartels’ effectiveness
and often leading to their dissolution. “Tight” combinations eliminated
this problem by bringing competition within a single firm. It was not until
the economic boom of the early twentieth century, however, that promoters gained access to the large amounts of capital required to finance mergers. Once this capital became available, mergers arose as a natural evolution of long-standing efforts to limit competition.159
These differences in competition policy between Canada and the United States had important consequences for the development of corporate
law. In the United States, antitrust law was an important factor in jurisdictional selection. When early decisions under the Sherman Act struck
down “loose” pricing and output agreements, corporations gravitated to
the jurisdiction most amenable to “tight” combinations—New Jersey. In
Canada, on the other hand, competition law had little bearing on the
structure of the merger movement. As discussed above, cartels had shown
their practical limitations as a means of controlling competition.160 At the
same time, tariff increases in 1907 further disadvantaged foreign imports,
increasing potential monopoly profits and encouraging domestic consolidation.161 Most importantly, buoyant conditions in the securities markets
and greater availability of foreign capital—both results of Canada’s ongoing economic boom—provided the necessary financing.162 Together, these
multiple factors set the stage for the 1909–1913 merger movement.
When it finally arrived, the sudden wave of industrial consolidation
led to renewed calls for stronger anti-combines law.163 The Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier responded by proposing a new bill “to provide
for the investigating of combines, monopolies, trusts and mergers which
may enhance prices or restrict competition to the detriment of consumers.”164 This bill, introduced in 1910 by Minister of Labour (and future
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Prime Minster) William Lyon Mackenzie King, addressed the enforcement problem that had plagued previous anti-combines acts by empowering private citizens to initiate judicial investigations of combinations.165
The bill was also broader in scope than previous anti-combines acts, encompassing “all forms of combination” including “monopolies, trusts, mergers and combines.”166 This language was more expansive than the act of
1889, which, by its terms, was arguably limited to “loose” arrangements
among independent companies. Notwithstanding these reforms, the bill’s
policy ambitions were limited. According to King, the bill was “not aimed
against combines or mergers as such,” but merely against their exercise of
power “in an unfair manner.”167 Like many Liberals, King believed industrial consolidation was a natural aspect of economic progress, which so
long as it was properly regulated, stood to benefit society as a whole. King
therefore declined to follow the Sherman Act, which some Canadian lawmakers considered overly restrictive.168 King’s bill, successfully passed in
1910 as the Combines Investigation Act, reflected the ambivalence at the
heart of Canadian competition policy. Despite the act’s broader language
and its inclusion of judicial investigations, it provided no effective mechanism for enforcement of its terms.169 The act was successful from a political standpoint, in that it signaled the government’s ostensible concern,
but it had almost no practical impact. It was invoked only once (against
an American company) before being repealed in 1919.170
This is all to say that Canadian competition law had little effect on industrial organization. Although Canadian businesses eventually adopted
the “tight” organizational structures common in the United States, their
reasons for doing so were primarily related to exogenous economic factors,
rather than changes in competition law.171 Indeed, given the timing of the
initial merger wave (beginning in 1909) and the passage of the Combines
Investigation Act (adopted in 1910), it is more likely economic changes influenced legislation than the other way around. Of course, anti-combines
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legislation was only one aspect of the regulatory environment—company
law, discussed below, played an equally important role.

B. Canadian Company Law
Beyond anti-combines legislation, company law played a major role in
Canadian merger activity. Two characteristics of Canadian law stand out:
first, unlike the United States, Canada enacted federal legislation regarding the creation of limited companies. Canadian promoters therefore had
access to a national body of corporate law. Second, by 1909, Canadian law
was less restrictive than the traditional corporate law of most American
states. Since federal company law—available anywhere across the country—imposed few restrictions on mergers, neither corporate promoters
nor the provinces themselves had reason to advance an alternative system. More than any other factor, it was the permissive nature of company
law at the time of the Canadian merger movement that precluded the jurisdictional competition experienced in the United States.
Canada’s tradition of parallel federal and provincial corporate law
emerges from the Confederation period. By its terms, the British North
America Act, 1867 granted the power of incorporation solely to the provinces, providing them exclusive authority to form “Companies with Provincial Objects.”172 However, the federal division of power under the Canadian constitution system—by which the provinces are granted plenary
authority over specific enumerated subjects, and all subjects not so enumerated are reserved to the national government—left open the possibility that the Dominion government could incorporate companies with national objects.173 Although the existence of this power was uncertain, the
Parliament of Canada passed a joint stock companies act shortly following
Confederation.174 The federal act was largely based on preexisting legislation of the Province of Canada, itself derived from a combination of English and American influences.175 The federal act was amended several
times over subsequent decades, but its structure remained grounded in
Confederation-era legislation.
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Like the provincial statute on which it was based, the first federal
companies act featured a distinctive “letters patent” system, by which
companies were formed under the executive authority of the Governor-inCouncil.176 Although the letters patent system was unique to Canada, it
was similar to English law in its approach to corporate governance.177
Both English and Canadian law permitted wide discretion in organizing
company affairs and imposed relatively few restrictions on substantive
business activities. This was in contrast with many American states,
which generally imposed stricter limits on size, structure, and business
practices. These differences are evident from comparing (1) the Canadian
Companies Act, 1902,178 (2) the English Companies Acts, 1862 to 1907,179
and (3) the state corporation acts described in Annex A. Although their
details varied, English and Canadian company law were broadly similar
in that neither included the antitrust provisions that were common in
American statutes.180 If anything, the Canadian act was even more permissive than English legislation.
None of this to say Canadian law was a model of corporate liberalism,
however. Prior to the Companies Act, 1902, incorporating a business was
an onerous, time-consuming process, requiring application to the Secretary of State and a full month’s prior notice in the Canada Gazette.181 Early Canadian law also made consolidation difficult. As in many US states,
the pre-1902 stock companies act prohibited intercompany stock purchases, preventing companies from using their funds to acquire the shares of
other companies.182 The federal act also required that a majority of directors be resident Canadians and subjects of the Crown, which likely discouraged foreign investment.183 Indeed, although the delay in the Canadi176
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an merger movement was primarily due to economic factors, restrictions
in Canadian company law may have also played a role.
As the years passed, the federal joint stock companies act was amended several times, but major changes to its core provisions did not arrive
until 1902, with the passage of the revised and restated Companies Act,
1902. These revisions significantly liberalized Canadian company law.
The most important changes “assimilated the law of Canada to the law of
England, and removed many obstructions to the obtaining of charters
which formerly existed under [the] old statute.”184 Parliament’s intentions
in revising the act were unmistakably pro-business. The goal of the revisions was to maximize the freedom of “private enterprises to unite together” and to remove “any obstructions or obstacles” to the formation of joint
stock companies.185 In this spirit, the act simplified the incorporation process and removed any requirement of prior public notice.186 According to
Liberal Senator and Secretary of State Richard Scott, the primary drafter
of the act, the reforms greatly simplified federal law, reducing the incorporation process from a matter of months to a matter of days.187 The act
also included broader reforms intended to attract companies to Canada.
For example, the act expressly provided that foreign companies could reincorporate under Canadian law, a provision meant to attract British and
American capital.188 For similar reasons, the requirement that company
directors be Canadian residents or British subjects was removed.189 Finally, although the act adopted the English rule allowing shareholders to initiate judicial inspections, the Canadian legislation—unlike the English
companies acts—did not require full public disclosure.190 Canadian law184
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makers felt that public disclosure was overly burdensome, especially for
smaller firms.191
Under the revised act, companies enjoyed a variety of means of combining into larger firms. Some of these methods already existed, while
others were introduced by the 1902 revisions. Under existing law, Canadian companies had long been able to purchase the assets of other
firms,192 a common means of transferring a business from one corporate
owner to another.193 Under the 1902 act, companies were also empowered
to purchase and hold company stock, if authorized by their letters patent
or by-laws.194 This power allowed holding companies to purchase the stock
of independent firms, consolidating separate businesses under a single
corporate ownership structure. Companies were also permitted to issue
shares in exchange for property, allowing them to finance acquisitions by
issuing their own stock.195 Together, these powers enabled promoters to
organize combinations by (1) forming a holding company (or using an existing firm as a holding company) and (2) acquiring competing businesses,
using the holding company’s shares as consideration.196 This acquisition
process was similar to the merger structure used by New Jersey corporations.197 Indeed, James B. Dill was cited in Parliament as an instructive
American authority.198 A final method of combining firms was legal
“amalgamation,” the melding of two companies into one. Although the
Companies Act, 1902 did not specifically address amalgamation, it was
apparently permitted under general law if both companies claimed the
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power in their letters patent.199 That said, true amalgamations were rare.
Instead, combinations were typically organized as stock or asset purchases.200
The legislative history of the 1902 act reveals its pro-business orientation. The parliamentary debates surrounding the act showed strong support for joint stock companies.201 Senator Scott stated explicitly that the
goal of the legislation was to attract joint stock companies to Canada, particularly those financed by British and American capital.202 He specifically
praised English law for attracting “enormous sums of money” to that
country in the form of corporate investment.203 In the House of Commons,
Clifford Sifton, the minister of the interior, expressed a similar view, stating that “in respect to that class of companies which can be described as
industrial companies every possible facility should be given for incorporation” and that “incorporation should be made as speedy, as free from unnecessary difficulty and as inexpensive as possible.”204
Equally as significant as these positive views was the notable absence
of anti-corporate political rhetoric. Unlike the United States—where leading figures in the Democratic Party sought harsh restrictions on corporations, and even the most pro-business Republicans felt compelled to denounce corporate excesses—there was little discussion in the Parliament
of Canada of limiting the power of joint stock companies. At a time when
fear of corporate monopoly was at a high point in American politics, Canadian politicians were instead concerned with encouraging capital formation. What can explain these differences? First, in 1902, Canada had
not yet experienced the massive combinations that dominated the US
economy.205 For this simple reason, controlling combinations was less of a
concern among the Canadian electorate.206 Although Canadians certainly
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resented cartels, the economy had not yet experienced the outright monopolization of entire industries.207 Second, to a greater extent than in the
United States, Canadian politics was dominated by a conservative, patrician political elite which was generally sympathetic to the country’s business and financial community.208 Not only were the parliamentary debates on the Companies Act, 1902 marked by general pro-business sentiment, but several lawmakers discussed the bill in terms of their own involvement in forming companies.209 This sympathy toward the business
class was reflected throughout Canadian economic policy, as illustrated by
the lack of effective prohibitions on price and output collision, the awarding of public “bonuses” for private economic development, and—last but
not least—the National Policy itself, which benefited Canadian producers
at the expense of Canadian consumers.210 A final factor may have been the
peripheral status of Canada itself, which remained less developed than
both the British metropole and the rapidly developing United States.211
Although Canada was a prosperous country by world standards, its relative underdevelopment compared to its two primary trading partners may
have contributed to a political culture particularly amenable to industrial
support. Whatever the exact reasons, the Canadian government was primarily concerned with helping, not hindering, joint stock companies.212
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Although Canadian lawmakers’ major concern was encouraging business development, revenue considerations were also important. In fact,
the politics surrounding the Companies Act, 1902 display elements of the
jurisdictional competition witnessed in the United States. By the turn of
the century, Ontario had surpassed the federal government in enacting
company law reform, such that it had become easier to incorporate under
Ontario law than under federal legislation.213 During the years
1895−1900, Ontario’s incorporation revenues grew nearly 500% as an increasing number of businesses chose to incorporate in the province.214
Given the rapid increase in provincial incorporations, there was concern
within Parliament that the slow, cumbersome nature of the federal incorporation process was discouraging its use by businesses. During the debates on the 1902 act, Senator Scott argued that Ontario law had become
more attractive than federal incorporation. To make his point, Scott gave
the example of “[o]ne of the largest companies recently established” in
Canada, which, although based in Quebec, had chosen to incorporate in
Ontario.215 According to Scott, the company would have preferred to “come
to Ottawa,” but the existing federal legislation was inadequate to its
needs.216 It appears that Scott and other officials believed the federal government was failing to provide an important service. There was even concern that Canadian companies might be leaving for the United States. In
the words of Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior:
The effect of the law as it exists at the present time has been to drive
the business away from the federal government. Persons have been
compelled to go to the various provinces and the various states of the
Union for the purpose of getting charters of incorporation. It will be
agreed by the House that we should have our law in such a state

had the effect of “distracting jurists, judges, regulators, and lawyers with issues of needless complexity” (ibid at 458).
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that persons would not have to go somewhere else to get a charter to
do business in Canada.217

The possibility of competition between the federal government and the
provinces was a source of controversy within Parliament. Different lawmakers had different views on the appropriate scope of federal legislation,
some considering it a source of revenue, others considering it a threat to
the provinces.218 For example, former prime minister Mackenzie Bowell
suggested the goal of reform was to “get more money.”219 Similarly, future
prime minister Robert Borden proposed reducing incorporation fees because “the fees secured by the government would be more if they were
somewhat lower.”220 On the one hand, these statements suggest that at
least some MPs conceived federal incorporation as a source of revenue. On
the other hand, several legislators warned that increasing federal incorporations would deprive the provinces of needed funds. Conservative Senator Josiah Wood opposed federal incorporation altogether, claiming it
would “take away from the provinces a source of revenue that is of considerable importance to many of the smaller provinces.”221 Liberal Senator
James McMullen raised similar concerns, warning that a reduction in
provincial revenues could destabilize Canada’s provincial revenue transfer system.222 In response to Senator Wood, Senator Scott, the architect of
the bill, assured the Senate that federal incorporation fees would be set
“at least as high as, if not higher than the provinces” so as not to cannibalize provincial revenues.223 As passed, the act’s intent seemed to be that
large, national firms would incorporate federally, while smaller, more local firms would incorporate under provincial law.
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Such were Parliament’s intentions. What, then, was the practical effect of the Companies Act, 1902? Although the empirical evidence is thin,
the act appears to have been successful in encouraging federal incorporation. A 1902 Globe224 article praising the new act reported that companies
could now be formed in as little as 48 hours. According to The Globe, the
act’s reforms were “highly appreciated” by the Canadian business and legal communities.225 A year later, The Globe reported incorporations in
Canada had reached unprecedented levels.226 However, this tally included
all joint stock companies—both federal and provincial—making it difficult
to determine the extent to which the increase was attributable to federal
reform. During the 5-year period of 1899−1903, there were 285 federal incorporations with a total capitalization of over $70 million.227 Over the
same period, there were 339 Ontario incorporations with a total capitalization of over $92 million.228 News reports from later years suggest the
1902 act may have been succesful in attracting new investment, both from
within Canada and abroad.229 Again, however, the share of companies
that incorporated federally as opposed to provincially is unclear.
This proportion becomes clearer in the context of the 1909−1913 merger wave. As Canadian industry consolidated, more than half of Canada’s
largest firms incorporated under federal law, suggesting its attractiveness
to Canadian promoters. Although comprehensive historical data on federal incorporations are unavailable, I was able to estimate the percentage of
large Canadian combinations that incorporated federally by crossreferencing Gregory Marchildon’s 1885−1918 industrial merger series230
against federal incorporation records from Library and Archives Canada.231 Based on this estimate, 97 of 174—roughly 56%—of large combina224
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tions were incorporated federally.232 When limiting the analysis to the
years 1909–1913, this figure becomes 50 of 71, or roughly 70%. Because
the Marchildon series includes valuation estimates for only a small number of combinations, it is impossible to calculate similar percentages based
on total transaction value. That said, there is reason to believe that the
largest combinations were the most likely to incorporate federally, implying that the share of federal corporations would be even greater on a valuation basis. Judging from an impressionistic review of the companies in
the Marchildon series, large, well-known combinations such as Canadian
Canners, Limited, the Dominion Bridge Company, and the Dominion Cotton Mills Company tended to use the federal act, while smaller and more
obscure combinations such as “Badgerow Faulkner Vinegar Manufacturing Company,” “Berlin Brush Works,” and “Edward Partington Pulp and
Paper Company Ltd.” tended to use provincial acts. Although difficult to
verify quantitatively, this pattern suggests that larger combinations were
particularly attracted to federal law. Moreover, additional evidence suggests federal law maintained its appeal over time. According to C. A. Curtis, between 1921 and 1933, the years encompassing the second Canadian
merger wave, the percentage of combinations incorporating federally remained greater than 66%.233
There are several reasons corporate promoters may have preferred
federal law. First, at the time of the first merger wave, the ability of pro-

Marchildon’s data are the most complete and most recent available for Canada. Unfortunately, for most mergers, the Marchildon series does not include the jurisdiction of incorporation of the surviving firm, making it difficult to determine whether the resulting
combination was incorporated under federal or provincial law. This problem led to the
second step of my procedure, which was to search the Corporations Branch records of
Library and Archives Canada for every combination in the Marchildon series. The archival records of the Corporations Branch (the predecessor of Corporations Canada) include organizational files for all companies incorporated, amalgamated, and/or dissolved under federal law between 1867 and 1973. In order to determine whether a particular combination was organized under federal law, I simply searched for it using the
archive’s search engine. I deemed combinations whose organizational documents are
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vincial companies to conduct national business remained uncertain.234
This issue was not definitively resolved until the 1916 case of The Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Limited v. The King and Another.235 In
this case, the Privy Council held that provincial companies could conduct
extra-provincial business so long as they received authorization from the
hosting jurisdiction.236 In reality, provincial companies had already been
engaging in extra-provincial business for years, but their constitutional
authority in doing so was uncertain before 1916.237
Canadian promoters may have also seen federal law as a means of
marketing their firms to foreign investors. In light of Canada’s marginal
status within the British economic empire, many promoters emphasized
the “national” scope of their merger projects to assure London-based investors of their credibility and financial soundness.238 Combinations often
had names beginning with “Canada,” “Canadian,” or “Dominion,” highlighting their national reach.239 This spirit of aggrandizement may have
extended to the incorporation process itself, with promoters choosing Dominion incorporation for its national cachet. Even in recent decades, the
legitimacy that federal law is believed to communicate to investors has
remained a factor in jurisdictional selection.240 In the early twentieth century, this factor was likely even more important.241
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Finally, federal law was popular for the simple reason that it facilitated mergers.242 In this regard, it is important to consider the typical means
by which Canadian combinations were formed. According to Curtis’ study,
the most common method of forming combinations was through outright
purchases of business assets, followed closely by purchases of stock.243 Out
of 374 business consolidations between 1900 and 1933 (a period encompassing the first and second Canadian merger waves), a total of 189, or
just over 50%, were structured as asset purchases, a total of 155, or approximately 41%, were structured as stock purchases, and a total of 21, or
approximately 6%, were structured as a hybrid of asset and stock purchases.244 Clearly, stock and asset purchases were the dominant means of
forming combinations.
Consummating these purchases was a straightforward process under
the federal joint stock companies act. Unlike the corporation acts of most
American states (aside from New Jersey and its progeny), the Companies
Act, 1902 included no antitrust, anti-combination, or anti-monopoly provisions. Nor did it include limits on maximum capitalization, an important
issue for promoters seeking to issue public securities.245 Aside from railroad, telephony, and financial services companies, which were governed
by specific acts of Parliament, companies were not limited to specific lines
of business and were free from the quo warranto proceedings faced by
corporations in the United States. Finally, Canadian companies were expressly permitted to purchase the stock of other companies,246 a power
that remained uncertain under many state corporation acts.247 Given the
permissiveness of federal law, Canadian promoters had little reason to
seek alternative jurisdictions.
Even if they had, the companies acts of the individual provinces were
similarly liberal. The Ontario Companies Act, revised in 1897, was itself
242
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an important inspiration for the Companies Act, 1902.248 In 1897, the legislature of Ontario “very nearly assimilated their practice to the English
practice”249 by allowing the creation of joint stock companies without prior
public notice.250 Following earlier Canadian legislation, the Ontario act included no antitrust provisions and few restrictions on business activities.
Companies were allowed to purchase other companies’ shares if authorized by a by-law approved by two-thirds of the shareholders.251 As discussed above, these reforms were associated with a significant increase in
Ontario incorporations, which encouraged the federal government to reform its own companies act.252 Other provinces, including British Columbia and Nova Scotia, adhered even more closely to English law by maintaining the English practice of incorporation by registration.253 By 1907,
even Quebec had enacted companies legislation closely based on the Companies Act, 1902.254 Thus, although the largest combinations tended to incorporate federally, the substantive content of provincial law was not significantly different.
In sum, the legal environment in Canada during the country’s first
merger wave differed from the American environment roughly a decade
earlier. During the Great Merger Movement in the United States, both
antitrust law and market forces reduced the viability of “loose” combinations. At the same time, many states’ corporate laws also inhibited “tight”
combinations. In this environment, New Jersey provided an avenue of escape from the restrictive laws of its sister states. The success of New Jersey (and later Delaware) in attracting corporations eventually led to most
other states adopting similarly permissive legal regimes.255
In Canada, analogous provincial competition was relatively muted. By
the time the Canadian merger movement arrived, promoters enjoyed significant latitude in organizing combinations, mitigating the competitive
248

See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text.

249

Senate Debates, 8 April 1902, supra note 185 at 170 (Hon Richard William Scott).

250

See The Ontario Companies Act, RSO 1897, c 191, s 9.

251

See ibid, s 82. This requirement was stricter than the analogous provision in the Companies Act, 1902, which allowed share purchases if authorized by the by-laws or letters
patent (see Companies Act, 1902, supra note 178, s 35).

252

See supra notes 213–217 and accompanying text.

253

See Companies Act, 1897, RSBC 1897, c 44, s 9–18; Nova Scotia Companies’ Act, SNS
1900, c 11, s 6–15. The Nova Scotia act was so similar to the English Companies Acts
that it expressly cross-referenced English statutory provisions.

254

See The Quebec Companies’ Act, 1907, SQ 1907, c 48.

255

The complex historical influence of Delaware corporate law is described in Harwell
Wells, “The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940” (2009) 11:3 U Pa J Bus L
573 at 585–86, 590–91.

152

(2018) 64:1 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

pressures witnessed in the United States. Since Canadian businesses
could easily combine under existing federal company law, there was no
opportunity for any single province to capture the incorporation market.
Ultimately, the reason there was never a “Canadian New Jersey” is that
there was never any need for one—federal law already provided nearly
everything New Jersey offered. Had he cast his attentions northward,
James B. Dill would have approved.256

Conclusion
The industrial consolidation of the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries had lasting consequences in both Canada and the
United States. Following New Jersey’s early success in attracting corporations, the US entered a decades-long period of active jurisdictional competition. In the 1920s and 1930s, after Delaware had succeeded New Jersey,
many states embarked on comprehensive reforms to modernize their corporation statutes.257 These reforms were partly driven by the changing
needs of modern business, but they were also an attempt by state politicians to halt the “exodus” of corporations to Delaware.258 As the years
passed, this competitive pressure toward legal convergence led to an “Scurve” pattern in corporate reform, as an accelerating number of state
governments adopted various features of Delaware law.259 This process
was hastened by promulgation of the Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA), a model corporation statute published by the American Bar Association in 1950, which itself drew heavily on the Delaware-influenced Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933.260 Although the MBCA differed
from Delaware law in a number of important respects, it was far closer to
the Delaware act than to the traditional state acts of the nineteenth century.261 Today, the similarities among the different states largely outweigh their differences, and American corporate law—despite its diffusion
among fifty states—has grown increasingly standardized around the liberal Delaware model.
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Canadian corporate law has seen even greater standardization, but
unlike in the United States, the major driver of policy convergence has
been federal legislation. While state corporate law rapidly evolved during
the first half of the twentieth century, Canadian company law remained
relatively static until the legislative reforms of the 1970s. These reforms
began with the Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1970 and continued
with the adoption of the CBCA in 1975.262 In the decades between the
Companies Act, 1902 and the CBCA, the only major revision of federal
corporate law was the Companies Act, 1934, which maintained the letters
patent system of earlier legislation.263 According to the 1971 Dickerson
Report—the federal expert committee report that led to the CBCA—
Canadian corporate law had been “sadly neglected” for much of the preceding century, having not experienced significant change within “the last
hundred years.”264 Breaking from this tradition, the CBCA brought major
reforms, most notably by replacing the letters patent system with an
American-style incorporation process.265 The impact of the CBCA has extended beyond federal law. Moreover, in the years following the CBCA’s
adoption, a majority of the provinces enacted substantially similar acts,
resulting in considerable standardization of Canadian corporate law.266
Although this standardization was possibly a result of competition,267 it
appears more likely that provincial governments have pursued a strategy
of uniformity.268 Lacking an institutional tradition of competition among
the provinces, and with a number of legal and practical obstacles to an active incorporation market, Canadian law has modernized through a collective, consensual process.269
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RSO 1970, c 25; see Stewart, supra note 212 at 465–69. Ontario initiated this reform
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See Daniels, supra note 10 at 150–51.
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These differences in legal reform between the United States and Canada have contributed to substantive differences in American and Canadian corporate law. As a competitive supplier of a specialized legal product,
Delaware has been sensitive to the preferences of corporate managers, as
conveyed to the state legislature by the Delaware corporate bar. The
drafting of the CBCA was a more deliberate, technocratic process, informed by issues broader than the preferences of the business community.270 These differences are reflected in key aspects of the CBCA today. For
example, compared to Delaware, the CBCA provides greater protections
to minority shareholders.271 Similarly, neither the CBCA nor any provincial act includes express anti-takeover provisions of the type adopted by
many states (including Delaware) in the 1980s.272 Finally—and somewhat
incongruously, given its strong shareholder protections—Canadian law allows for greater recognition of non-shareholder “stakeholder” interests.
While fiduciary duties under Delaware law are generally owed to shareholders,273 the CBCA specifies that directors’ duties are owed to the “corporation,”274 a broader concept which has facilitated appeals to corporations’ social responsibilities. In Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise275
and Re BCE Inc.,276 the Supreme Court of Canada responded to these appeals by expressly allowing directors to consider a wide range of nonshareholder constituencies, a principle which was recently codified in the
CBCA itself.277 For better or worse, each of these features of Canadian law
have been shaped by general policy concerns, rather than by their desirability to business managers. The irony, of course, is that Canadian law’s
greater independence from the preferences of the business community is a

270

This process is both described in, and evidenced by Dickerson, Howard, & Getz, supra
note 264.
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These protections stem in large part from Canada’s broad oppression remedy. See
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Considered: 1995–2001” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s LJ 79 at 81–82, 102; Brian Cheffins, “The
Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience” (1988) 10:3 U Pa J
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result of business’ satisfaction at the height of the Canadian merger
movement.
In conclusion, American and Canadian corporate law have both been
influenced by historical factors. American law changed dramatically as a
result of the Great Merger Movement, while Canadian law evolved more
slowly until the legislative reforms of the 1970s, but both embody a liberal
approach to key issues of corporate governance. Despite the differences
described in this article, American and Canadian corporate law are in
many respects quite similar, partly due to the ongoing convergence of international corporate law and partly due to the specific influence of American law on Canada, of which the CBCA is an important example. Even at
the fundamental institutional level, the distinction between the “competitive” and “uniform” models may be weakening. Given Delaware’s decadeslong dominance of the US incorporation market, it is increasingly doubtful
whether other states compete for corporations at all.278 Moreover, considering Delaware’s pervasive influence on the corporate law of other states,
it is difficult to characterize the American system as a continuing laboratory of innovation.
In Canada, conversely, provincial competition is increasing. In the
years since Cumming and MacIntosh found an absence of provincial competition,279 several provinces have enacted reforms intended to attract
business organizations. Following the discovery in the 1990s that Nova
Scotia unlimited liability companies (“ULCs”) could be used as a taxsaving device by firms doing business in both the United States and Canada, Alberta and British Columbia adopted their own ULC legislation to
attract cross-border subsidiaries of American corporations.280 Indeed, Alberta’s and British Columbia’s entrance into the ULC market led to significant price competition in ULC registration fees.281 Another sign of
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Law Institute Conference on Comparative Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship in Canada and the United States, 13, 14 April 2010) (2007) 33:1 Can-USLJ 47 at 64–67; Robert
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competition is Quebec’s 2009 Business Corporations Act, which comprehensively restated Quebec corporate law.282 The new act includes several
reforms designed to enhance Quebec’s reputation as a business-friendly
jurisdiction and retain domestic corporations that would otherwise incorporate under the CBCA.283 Finally, in a clear (and apparently successful)
attempt to appeal to international investors, British Columbia eliminated
all residency requirements for corporate directors, making British Columbia particularly attractive for business entities with foreign ownership.284
Although the significance of these efforts remains a question for future research, the current literature likely understates the full extent of provincial competition.
Ultimately, this convergence between American and Canadian law is
unsurprising. The geographic, economic, and cultural proximity of the two
countries has ensured close parallels between their respective approaches
to business law. With respect to corporations, these parallels are particularly strong, though they have manifested historically in surprising and
unexpected ways. While recent developments in Canadian corporate law
have broadened its approach to social responsibility, particularly compared to Delaware law’s more narrow conception of corporate interest,
these developments are in fact a historical reversal of the traditional priorities of Canadian law. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was Canadian law that was more attentive to the interests of the business community and American law that was more reflective of social and political
concerns. Indeed, this political responsiveness was precisely the problem
(see E Miller Williams & Jeffrey Shafer, “The Canada-United States Tax Regime”
(2011) 36:1 Can-USLJ 209 at 227).
282
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from the perspective of American business leaders—and the underlying
cause of the “race to the bottom” experienced in the United States.285 As a
result of this process, American corporate law abandoned its concern with
limiting the power of corporations, thereby becoming increasingly similar
to the existing Canadian system.

285
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Annex A: State Law Restrictions on Corporations
This Annex A summarizes key antitrust provisions and other restrictions on corporations enacted by the five most prosperous states as of
1895 (immediately preceding the Great Merger Movement). The five
wealthiest states as of 1895 were New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio,
and Massachusetts, as measured by “true valuation of real and personal
property,” according to US, Statistical Abstract of the United States.286
These states were selected under the assumptions that (1) measured
wealth is a proxy for business activity and (2) prior to the rise of New Jersey, most corporations were legally organized under the law of their state
of origin.
STATE
1. New York

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
(organized by specific statute)
Stock Corporation Law287
§ 7. Combinations prohibited:
corporations were prohibited from
combining “for the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of
trade or for the prevention of competition in any necessary of life.”288
§ 42. Consideration for issue of
stock and bonds: corporations
were prohibited from issuing stock
for less than par value.289

286

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896) at 340–41.

287

See Stock Corporation Law, as amended in Charles A Collin, The Revised Statutes of
the State of New York: Together with All the Other General Statutes (except the Civil,
Criminal, and other Penal Codes) (Albany, NY: Banks & Brothers, 1896) vol 2 at 1003
[The Revised Statutes of the State of New York, vol 2].

288

Ibid at 1008.

289

See ibid at 1019. Acquiring stock for less than par value was the preferred means by
which inside promoters compensated themselves for organizing mergers: see Gabriel
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 19001916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967) at 17–24. Stock issued for an aggregate par
value in excess of the real value of the corporation’s tangible assets was referred to as
“watered stock” (ibid). For an overview of the meaning of “watered stock”, see “Watering
Stock” in Gary Giroux, ed, Business Scandals, Corruption, and Reform: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2003) vol 2 at 645–46). This phenomenon (referred to by Marchildon as promotional stock) is described in the Canadian context in
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Business Corporations Law290
§ 8. Consolidation of corporations: any two or more corporations
organized under the laws of New
York and conducting business “of
the same or of a similar nature”
could consolidate into a single corporation. However, the capitalization of any such consolidated corporation could not exceed the aggregate value of “the property, franchises, and rights” thereof.291
An Act to Prevent Monopolies in
Articles of General Necessity292
§ 1. Combinations whereby competition would be “restrained or prevented, for the purpose of advancing
prices” were prohibited.293
2. Pennsylvania

Corporations294
§ 65. Corporations were prohibited
from issuing capital stock in an

Gregory P Marchildon, Profits and Politics: Beaverbrook and the Gilded Age of Canadian Finance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 30–31, 69–71, 145–51.
290

See Business Corporations Law, as amended in The Revised Statutes of the State of New
York, vol 2, supra note 2 at 1384. While the Stock Corporation Law applied to all corporations, the Business Corporations Law applied to the narrower subset of corporations
organized for business purposes (ibid at 1384).

291

Ibid at 1385. Again, the limitation on capitalization was intended to prevent the issuance of watered stock: see Kolko, supra note 4 at 17–24.

292

See An Act to Prevent Monopolies in Articles of General Necessity, as amended in
Charles A Collin, The Revised Statutes of the State of New York: Together with All the
Other General Statutes (except the Civil, Criminal, and other Penal Codes) (Albany, NY:
Banks & Brothers, 1896) vol 3 at 2953.

293

Ibid.

294

See Corporations, as amended in Frank F Brightly, A Digest of the Statute Law of the
State of Pennsylvania from the Year 1700 to 1894 (Philadelphia: Kay and Brother, 1894)
vol 1 at 403.
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amount greater than one million
dollars.295
§ 67. Shareholders were prohibited
from purchasing capital stock with a
note or other debt obligation. Corporations were prohibited from purchasing or holding the stock of any
other corporation.296
Manufacturing Companies297
§ 1. Manufacturing corporations
were prohibited from issuing capital
stock in an amount greater than $5
million. This section also imposed
various limitations on the issuance
of preferred stock.298
§ 13. All manufacturing, mining,
and quarrying corporations were
strictly limited to the purpose of
their creation as specified in their
charters.299

295

See ibid at 404. Limiting capitalization to one million dollars (approximately
$30,100,000 in 2017 dollars) was a significant restriction on corporate size. To put this
amount in perspective, the United States Steel Corporation, one of the largest combinations of the era, was incorporated in New Jersey with a capitalization of nearly $1.4 billion (see John Moody, The Truth About the Trusts: A Description and Analysis of the
American Trust Movement (New York: Moody Publishing Company, 1904) at 453).

296

See Brightly, supra note 9 at 404.

297

See Manufacturing Companies, as amended in Frank F Brightly, A Digest of the Statute
Law of the State of Pennsylvania from the Year 1700 to 1894 (Philadelphia: Kay and
Brother, 1894) vol 2 at 1291. The Manufacturing Companies act applied specifically to
manufacturing corporations.

298

See ibid.

299

See ibid at 1293.

CORPORATE LAW FEDERALISM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

3. Illinois

161

An Act Concerning Corporations300
§ 5. Powers—restrictions as to
real estate: corporations were permitted to hold real and personal estate, but only to the extent necessary for the transaction of their
business.301
Trusts and Conspiracies Against
Trade302
§ 1. Defines a trust: “any combination of persons, firms, corporations,
or associations for the purpose of fixing prices, restricting output, or otherwise reducing competition” was
defined as a “trust.”303
§ 2. Forfeiture of franchise: any
corporation violating the act (i.e.,
fixing prices, restricting output, or
otherwise reducing competition) forfeited its charter and franchise,
thereby ceasing to exist.304
§ 10. Purchaser liable: any customer of any person, firm, corporation, or association violating the act
was not liable to pay for the goods or
services purchased.305

300

See An Act Concerning Corporations, as amended in Harvey B Hurd, The Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois, 1893 (Chicago: Chicago Legal News Company) at 364.

301

See ibid at 365. As discussed in Part II A, this section was interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Illinois to limit the ability of corporations to purchase the shares of other corporations (see People ex rel Peabody v Chicago Gas Trust Co, 130 Ill 268 (Ill Sup Ct
1889)).

302

Hurd, supra note 15 at 519.

303

Ibid.

304

See ibid.

305

See ibid at 520.
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Quo Warranto306
§ 1. Any corporation exercising
“powers not conferred by law” was
subject to a quo warranto proceeding.307
4. Ohio

Corporations308
§ 3863. Manufacturing and mining
corporations were permitted to purchase the stock of railroad and other
transportation corporations, but only with the consent of two-thirds of
the shareholders of the target corporation.309
Quo Warranto310
§ 6761. Any corporation that “misused a franchise, privilege, or right
conferred upon it by law” or that
“exercised a franchise, privilege, or
right in contravention of law” was
potentially subject to a state civil action.311

5. Massachusetts

Of Certain Powers, Liabilities, and
Duties of Corporations312

306

See Quo Warranto, as amended by Hurd, supra note 15 at 1087.

307

Ibid.

308

See Corporations, as amended in Florian Giauque, The Revised Statutes of the State of
Ohio (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896) vol 1 at 801.

309

See ibid at 974. Although this provision is somewhat unclear, it seems to imply that
stock purchases were generally prohibited.

310

See Quo Warranto, as amended in Florian Giauque, The Revised Statutes of the State of
Ohio (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896) vol 2 at 1662.

311

Ibid at 1662–63. This section provided the basis for the Ohio Attorney General’s lawsuit
to dissolve the Standard Oil Trust: see State ex rel Attorney General v Standard Oil Co,
30 NE 279 (Ohio Sup Ct 1892) at 287–88.

312

See Of Certain Powers, Liabilities, and Duties of Corporations, as amended in The Public Statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Boston: Rand, Avery & Company,
1882) at 564.
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§ 17. Corporations were prohibited
from issuing shares for less than par
value.313
Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations314
§ 7. Manufacturing, mechanical, and
mining corporations were prohibited
from issuing capital stock in excess
of one million dollars.315
§ 37. When any manufacturing, mechanical, or mining corporation increased its capital stock, all shareholders were entitled to participate
in proportion to their shareholdings.316
§ 42. Imposed various limitations on
the issuance of preferred stock.317
§§ 46–49. Corporations were prohibited from issuing stock in exchange
for debt or personal services.318

313

See ibid at 567. Again, acquiring stock for less than par value was the preferred means
by which inside promoters compensated themselves for organizing mergers (see Kolko,
supra note 4 at 17–24).

314

See Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations, as amended in The Public Statutes of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 27 at 570 [Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations].

315

See ibid at 573.

316

See ibid at 577–78. Since many combinations acquired individual corporations by issuing shares in exchange for the target corporation’s stock or assets, this section made
mergers more difficult (see Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977)
at 319–20, 323, 332, 387, 415).

317

See Of Manufacturing and Other Corporations at 578.

318

See ibid at 579. This rule discouraged large consolidative mergers by preventing the
surviving corporation from issuing free or discounted shares to inside promoters. Promoters were often issued shares as compensation for organizing a combination (see
Kolko, supra note 4 at 17–24).

